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NOTES & COMMENTS
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FLEXIBLE DUTY
STANDARD OF LIABILITY UNDER SEC RULE 10b-5
Rule 10b-51 is the Securities and Exchange Commission's broadest prohibition against manipulative and deceptive practices in securities transactions. The rule generally prohibits fraudulent practices, but more specifically it makes unlawful false statements or
omissions of material facts in connection with the purchase or sale of
a security. Unlike some sections of the securities laws, 2 Rule 10b-5
does not grant private parties a cause of action. Courts recognized a
private right of action under the rule shortly after its adoption,3 how'Enacted pursuant to statutory authority granted in § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not

misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973).
'The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970), provides two specific
civil actions. Section 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970), imposes almost absolute liability on
persons connected with the drafting and filing of a false registration statement. Defenses are limited in a § 11 action, and the plaintiff must not have known of the omission
or untruth of the statement and may be required to post a bond for costs of the suit.
Damages are limited to the actual cost of the securities issued, and there is a relatively
short statute of limitations. Section 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970), allows a private action
for false statements in a stock prospectus. The defendant has the burden of proof to
demonstrate that he did not know or could not have known by exercise of due diligence
the falsity of the statements made. The plaintiff must lack knowledge of the falsity of
the statement in the prospectus, may recover only the consideration paid and interest,
and is subject to a short statute of limitations. The Securities Exchange Act confers a
private right of action only in § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970), for misleading statements
in reports, applications or documents filed pursuant to the act, rules or regulations.
See generally 1 A. BROMBERG, SEctrrEs LAw: FRAuD, RuLE 10b-5, §§ 2.1, 2.3 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as BROMBERG].
3
A private right of action under Rule 10b-5 was not granted until five years after
the rule was adopted. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa.
1947).
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ever, acknowledging that private suits were necessary to enforce the
rule and effectuate the broad purposes of the securities laws.'
In an attempt to limit the judicially created private action under
Rule 10b-5, courts formulated certain elements, proof of which was
necessary for recovery by a private plaintiff. These elements included
a connection with the purchase or sale of a security, 5 materiality,'
privity, 7 causation, reliance,8 damages and scienter 9 The judicial
'Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 241 n.18
(2d Cir. 1974). Cf. J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (private enforcement
of proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to SEC action).
5
The requirement of some "connection with the purchase or sale of any security,"
found in the text of the rule, has been liberally construed by the courts. The Second
Circuit has interpreted "connection" to mean that the manipulative or deceptive
device employed be of the nature that would cause reasonable investors to rely on it
and, in connection with the device, so relying, cause them to purchase or sell a corporation's securities. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). See also Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 239-40 (2d Cir. 1974); 2 BROMBERG, § 7.6. A strict definition
of the terms "purchase or sale" was first established in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952). The Birnbaum Rule
has been extensively criticized for its restrictive limitations on standing to sue under
Rule 10b-5, and has been substantially diluted by the courts. See, e.g., Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967) (standing granted
to plaintiff who was not an actual seller, but who became a forced seller as a result of
a merger). Some courts have rejected the Birnbaum Rule outright. Eason v. GMAC,
490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974). See Note, The Birnbaum Rule Rejected: Will Analysis of Right to Bring Private Actions Under § 10(b)
Be Simplified?, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 757 (1974).
'Rule 10b-5(b) prohibits misrepresentations or omissions of material facts. Material facts are generally defined as facts which would affect a reasonable investor's
decision to purchase or sell securities. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972) (facts are material in that a reasonable investor might have
considered them important); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (facts such as a reasonable investor would
rely on in purchasing or selling securities).
'Some "semblance of privity" between the plaintiff and defendant was first required in Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701, 706
(S.D.N.Y. 1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952). Presumably the reference is to
privity of contract between plaintiff and defendant. 2 BROMBERG § 8.5(511) at 207. This
requirement has now been generally rejected by courts. See, e.g., Sargent v. Genesco,
Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 759-60 (5th Cir. 1974); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d
90, 101 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971). The practical effect of not

requiring privity is to allow purchasers or sellers on national securities markets to sue
violators of the rule without demonstrating face-to-face contact. See, e.g., Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd,
495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
8The text of Rule 10b-5 does not require causation or reliance for recovery. Courts
frequently state that a showing of causation is necessary, see Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), and cases cited

1975]

RULE 10b-5

development of these elements has led to a gradual dilution of their
limiting effect,'0 and the elimination of some elements altogether."
In the case of all but scienter, nearly uniform application among the
circuit courts has resulted.' 2 Scienter, unlike the other elements, has
not been uniformly defined. While all courts have rejected the strict
common law definition of scienter, they have differed in their interpretation of the precise state of mind requirement for liability.'3 Some
courts have held negligence sufficient, while others have required
more than negligent conduct.
In addition to the scienter conflict, the relaxed requirements for
granting recovery have led to a change in the method of analyzing the
elements of liability. In earlier private litigation under Rule 10b-5,
liability was determined by reference to the particular elements developed by the courts." The subsequent dilution of the elements led
some courts to analyze liability in terms of a duty which the rule
therein, without stating to what degree the defendant must have caused the plaintiff's
injury. While some commentators point out that there is simply no causal connection
between violations of Rule 10b-5 involving nondisclosure and injury to investors on
open markets who would have traded anyway, this view has been rejected by courts.
See Id. at 276-79. Similar problems exist with regard to reliance on the defendant's
actions. Reliance and causation are no longer clearly distinguishable, according to
Professor Bromberg. 2 BROMBERO § 8.6(1). See also Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 239 (2d Cir. 1974). The Supreme Court has noted
that under circumstances of nondisclosure, positive proof of reliance is not necessary
for recovery. Similarly, failure to disclose a material fact when the defendant was
obligated to disclose it has established the requisite causation in fact. Affiliated Ute
Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972). See also Shapiro v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d at 239-40.
'At common law scienter meant knowledge or belief by the defendant that the
representation was false, or possession-by the defendant of insufficient information on
which to make the representation. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS, §105,
at 685-86 (4th ed. 1971). Scienter, as used in securities fraud cases, has been characterized as intent to deceive, Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D.
Colo. 1964); knowledge or recklessness, Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d 115, 123
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973); and negligence or lack of due diligence,
Batchelor v. Legg & Co., 52 F.R.D. 553, 556-57 (D. Md. 1971). See also 2 BROMBERG §
8.4(500). When the term scienter is used in this note it is done so in the loosest sense
of the term as it existed at common law. When used it will generally indicate a state
of mind encompassing intent, knowledge, recklessness and negligence. When scienter
is used in a specific sense, such as negligence, it also includes higher degrees as well,
such as recklessness, knowledge and intent.
I"See notes 5-6, 8-9 supra.
"See note 7 supra.
12This is not strictly true, as application of the Birnbaum Rule illustrates. See note
5 supra.
"See text accompanying notes 24-26 infra.
"See text accompanying notes 5-9 supra.
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imposed upon the defendant. 5 The use of a duty analysis did not
represent a major substantive change in the elements required for
recovery, but only an alteration in the conceptual framework of liability. Thus, while the established elements of liability remained unchanged, duty analysis began to emerge as a new analytical method
for determining liability.
In a recently decided case, White v. Abrams, 6 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals adopted a duty analysis which differed from that
used by other courts, most notably the Second Circuit. The White
court's duty analysis departed from earlier formulations of liability
in two respects. Most significantly, the court rejected any single definition of the scienter element as an appropriate characterization of
the requisite state of mind for imposition of liability. 7 The court also
proposed a flexible duty standard," and indicated that the duty imposed would vary with the circumstances of each case. Both of these
factors, variable scienter and flexible duty, were combined into a
single liability test for Rule 10b-5 private actions. Furthermore,
while other courts adopting a duty analysis have not altered the
substantive elements of liability, White significantly departed from
the earlier more rigid standards, and broadened the definition of
scienter. Finally, in a more subtle development, the court extended
the duty analysis beyond earlier articulations by greatly expanding
15A duty of disclosure is derived from clause (b) of Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5(b) (1973), which proscribes untrue statements of material fact or omissions of material fact necessary to make statements made, in light of the circumstances under which
they are made, not misleading. See, e.g., Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft
Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 362-63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973). The duty has
also been expressed as a duty to convey undisclosed information to prospective purchasers of securities. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1289 (2d Cir. 1973). Although no court has specifically so stated, presumably the duty to disclose includes a
duty not to misrepresent, since Rule 10b-5 proscribes both misrepresentations and
omissions.
1495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
1Id. at 734. Other courts have established a uniform scienter requirement which
would hold a defendant liable under Rule 10b-5 for either negligent, reckless, or knowing conduct, assuming all other elements of liability are proved. Precisely which degree
of scienter will suffice is a matter of dispute among circuit courts. See text accompanying notes 24-26 infra. White suggests, however, that scienter is a variable factor which
in combination with the duty of disclosure may vary according to the facts of each case.
See text accompanying notes 101-03 infra.
1495 F.2d at 734-36.
11Id. Compare Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 36364 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973), which established a two-step duty test
for liability, requiring a breach of a duty of disclosure which was at least reckless or
knowing.
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the potential scope of duty imposed by the rule and factors to be used
in defining the duty.
An understanding of the standard of liability proposed in White
v. Abrams requires an analysis of earlier cases which established
scienter standards and applied duty analysis under Rule 10b-5. It can
then be determined whether White really suggests any new standard
of liability in terms of scienter, the possible duties imposed by the
rule, or factors governing the scope of the duty. Finally, it must be
determined whether the flexible duty test proposed by White is a
workable standard which adequately identifies the necessary requisites for liability in private damage actions under the rule.
Previous Case Law
Federal courts have exercised extensive discretion in formulating
appropriate standards of scienter under Rule 10b-5. Some early decisions rejected proof of scienter in its strictest common law meaning
of intent to mislead or deceive the plaintiff, and instead required
proof that the defendant knew the representation was false.2 ' Other
courts disregarded the proof of fraud requirement and suggested that
negligence 2 or strict liability 3 would suffice for recovery. However,
"The Supreme Court has heard only three cases involving Rule 10b-5. They are
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Superintendent of Ins.
v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S.
453 (1969). The Court has taken a broad view of the securities laws, indicating that
they should be construed "not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate
their remedial purposes." SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180,
195 (1963).
"See, e.g., Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1290-91 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970) (trend is clearly away from enforcing scienter
equal to intent to defraud); Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757,
771-72 (D. Colo. 1964) (statutory language implies knowing or intentional conduct).
2
"See Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123, 126 (7th Cir. 1972); City
Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 230 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905
(1970); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 747 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379 (10th Cir. 1965); Blakely v. Lisac, 357 F.
Supp. 255 (D. Ore. 1972), appealpending, 9th Cir., CCH FED. SEC. L. RP. %73,031;
Batchelor v. Legg & Co., 52 F.R.D. 553 (D. Md. 1971). The category of negligence has
generated a controversy among both courts and commentators as to its sufficiency for
liability under Rule 10b-5. See Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255,
280-81 (3d Cir.) (Adams, J., concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874
(1972); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 866-67 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly,
J., concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67
Nw. U.L. REv. 562 (1972); Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and
State of Mind in Rule 10b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 423 (1968);
Comment, Negligent MisrepresentationUnder Rule 10b-5, 32 U. CH L. REv. 824
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the rejection of common law notions of scienter has not eliminated
the requirement altogether. While courts still frequently use the term
"scienter," its common law meaning has been diluted to a state of
mind concept which has been expressed in three different versions.
The three standards currently used among the circuit courts are:
actual knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, 2 more
than mere negligence, 25 and negligence." The distinction has narrowed to a question of whether a negligence standard or a stricter
standard of recklessness or knowledge should be applied in private
damage actions.2 7 The leading proponent of the stricter standard is
the Second Circuit,28 while the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth
(1965); Note, Proof of Scienter Necessary in a Private Suit Under SEC Anti-Fraud
Rule 10b-5, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1070 (1965).
One commentator has pointed out that even though some circuits claim to impose
a negligence standard, either by direct holding or implication, no circuit court has ever
actually imposed liability solely for negligent misrepresentation or nondisclosure.
Bucklo, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562, 590 (1972).
3Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 747 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951

(1968) (Rule 10b-5 includes even innocent disclosures which may amount to manipulative or deceptive conduct); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379 (10th Cir. 1965) (only
necessary to prove one of the prohibited actions), reaffirmed in Kerbs v. Fall River
Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 739 n.6 (10th Cir. 1974). But see Bucklo, Scienterand Rule
l0b-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 562, 590 (1972) (stating that no liability has yet been imposed
for less than knowing or reckless conduct).
2
Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857
(1973). The Cohen court defined recklessness or knowledge:
The standard for determining liability under Rule 10b-5 essentially is
whether plaintiff has established that defendant either knew the material facts that were misstated of omitted and should have realized
their significance, or failed or refused to ascertain and disclose such
facts when they were readily available to him and he had reasonable
grounds to believe that they existed.
Id. at 123, followed in Vohs v. Dickson, 495 F.2d 607, 622 (5th Cir. 1974). See also
Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 1973) (actual knowledge
satisfies any scienter requirement).

=Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 761 (5th Cir. 1974); Smallwood v. Pearl
Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 606 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3202 (Oct. 15,
1974).2
'See cases cited in note 22 supra.

2The degree of scienter required differs, however, when the SEC sues to enforce
Rule 10b-5. In enforcement actions, negligence is generally considered sufficient scienter for issuance of an injunction. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833, 854-55 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (in an enforcement action
negligent insider conduct is unlawful). But see SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 312

F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (on remand; injunction against corporation denied, no
likelihood of repetition of conduct).
2-See, e.g., Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 362 (2d
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Circuits 29 are generally believed to allow recovery for negligence.2
The conflict among circuit courts over the necessary degree of
scienter is understandable in view of the various sources which have
been considered in an attempt to determine the proper standard to
be applied under Rule 10b-5. The text of the rule states necessary
elements for recovery,' but it does not suggest with certainty the
degree of scienter required for liability.23 Because the rule itself does
not resolve the scienter question, courts have with little success examined the legislative history of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act.3 The administrative history of Rule 10b-5 is similarly inconclusive,34 although it does lend credence to the conclusion that the rule
was promulgated as an antifraud regulation, 3 requiring some form of
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d 115, 123
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973).
"See cases cited in note 22 supra.
3"See, e.g., Comment, Scienter in Private Damage Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 57
GEO. L.J. 1108, 1117 n.61 (1969); Comment, Liability UnderRule lOb-5 for Negligently
Misleading Corporate Releases: A Proposal for the Apportionment of Losses, 122 U.
PA. L. REV. 162, 165 n.14 (1973). See also notes 70 & 75 infra.
"See notes 1, 5-9 supra.
3'Clauses (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5 use the terms defraud, fraud or deceit, which
presumably include some form of scienter. On the other hand, clause (b) prohibits
untrue statements or omissions of material fact without reference to fraud or scienter.
See Epstein, The Scienter Requirement in Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 48 N.C. L. REv.
482 (1970); Comment, Negligent Misrepresentation Under Rule 10b-5, 32 U. Cm. L.
REv. 824 (1965). Articulating scienter as a congressionally imposed culpability requirement for liability under the securities acts which requires greater than negligent conduct avoids this constructional argument. See text accompanying notes 40-41 infra.
3'Professor Bromberg writes that "[s]ection 10(b) was one of the least controversial parts of the 1934 Act." 1 BROMBERG, § 2.2(300), at 331. Of the approximately one
thousand pages of hearings conducted by the House, references to § 10(b) would barely
fill one page. The same is true for the Senate version of the bill. Thomas G. Corcoran,
one of the drafters of the 1934 Act, when testifying before the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, characterized § 10(b) as a catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices. Id.
31The particular circumstances surrounding the promulgation of Rule 10b-5 are
related in Conference on Codification of the FederalSecuritiesLaws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793,
922 (1967). See also, 1 BROMBERG, § 2.2(400).
"Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230, effective May 21, 1942, announced
Rule 10b-5. The release provided in part:
The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced the
adoption of a rule prohibiting fraud by any person in connection with
the purchase of securities. The previously existing rules against fraud
in the purchase of securities applied only to brokers and dealers. The
new rule closes a loophole in the protections against fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting individuals or companies
from buying securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase. ...
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
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scienter prior to allowing recovery. Still another formulation balanced the degree of proof required by the private liability provisions
of the 1933 Securities Act 36 against the broader recovery allowed
under the implied Rule 10b-5 private action to determine the applicable scienter standard. 37 Because none of these sources was conclusive
of the scienter issue, no judicial consensus on the proper standard
emerged.
In addition to these varied sources, the gradual pre-emption of
specific liability provisions by Rule 10b-5 5 and the decline of the
common law fraud basis of liability39 led courts to examine the broad
purposes and general scheme of prohibitions and private recovery
under the securities acts as a whole.4" The result of this examination
was not a new standard of liability under Rule 10b-5, but an articulation of scienter as a congressionally imposed culpability requirement.
While this development may have encouraged an abandonment of
the traditional scienter label, courts still formulated culpability in
terms of negligence, recklessness, knowledge, or intent, depending
"See note 2 supra.
3See, e.g., Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951); Weber v.
C.M.P. Corp., 242 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). The express liability provisions were
balanced against Rule 10b-5 in one case by requiring knowing or intentional conduct
under the rule, as opposed to § 12(2) of the Securities Act, which, the court said,
imposed a negligence standard on the defendant. Thiele v. Shields, 131 F. Supp. 416
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
"See Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852
(1970) (§ 12(2) of the Securities Act is not an exclusive remedy); Ellis v. Carter, 291
F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961) (Congress in effect nullified the limits expressed in the 1933
Act by the 1934 Act); Blakely v. Lisac, 357 F. Supp. 255 (D. Ore. 1972), appeal
73,031. In SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393
pending, 9th Cir., CCH FED. SEC. L. RP.
U.S. 453 (1969), the Supreme Court commented upon the conflicting remedies between
express and implied rights of action, stating: "The fact that there may well be some
overlap is neither unusual nor unfortunate." Id. at 468.
3
decline of a common law fraud basis for liability is evidenced in at least two
"The
respects under Rule lOb-5. Courts have generally rejected scienter in the common law
fraud definition, see note 21, supra, in spite of the constructional argument that it is
required by clauses (a) and (c) of the rule. See note 32 supra. This reluctance rigidly
to apply common law fraud concepts to Rule 10b-5 can also be seen in the now general
rejection of a privity requirement for liability. See, e.g., Sargent v. Genesco, Inc., 492
F.2d 750, 759-60 (5th Cir. 1974); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971). Other factors required for common law fraud,
and still required in Rule 10b-5 cases, are attributable to the requirements of the rule
itself, such as materiality, connection with the purchase or sale of a security, and some
contact with interstate commerce. See generally notes 1 and 5-9 supra.
"°See Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973); Kohn v. American Metal
Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 280 (3d Cir.) (Adams, J., concurring and dissenting), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972).
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upon the standard of the particular circuit." But this recently developed conceptualization of culpability complemented the concurrent
development of duty analysis in securities fraud litigation.
Use of duty concepts in Rule 10b-5 cases is not new. The first case
to impose civil liability under the rule characterized the violation in
terms of duty. 2 Later courts also discussed duty, particularly when
some form of fiduciary responsibility was involved.43 The Second Circuit recently adopted a duty analysis standard and suggested that
Rule 10b-5 imposes a form of fiduciary duty upon parties to securities
transactions. 4 The court in Chris-CraftIndustries, Inc. v. PiperAircraft Corp.4" explained:
The initial inquiry in each case is what duty of disclosure the
law should impose upon the person being sued . . . .Those
with greater access to information, or having a special relationship to investors making use of the information, often may
have an affirmative duty of disclosure. When making a representation, they are required to ascertain what is material as of
the time of the transaction and to disclose fully "those material facts abbut which the [investor] is presumably uninformed and which would, in reasonable anticipation, affect his
judgment.

"See Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 362 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255,
280 (3d Cir.) (Adams, J., concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972).
"Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (Plaintiff's case
was established when defendant's duty and its breach were proved).
OAffiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (defendant was a
market maker); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (corporate director); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963) (majority stockholder); Canizaro v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 370 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. La. 1974), appealpending, 5th Cir.,
73,031 (customer-broker suit); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L.
REP. 92,748 (N.D. 111. 1970) (broker).
"See text accompanying note 46 infra.
45480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973). The Chris-Craftcase
involved a private action under § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78n(e) (1970), which prohibits fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative practices in
tender offers. Piper Aircraft, with the aid of Bangor Punta Industries, successfully
defended a takeover attempt by Chris-Craft. Chris-Craft alleged fraud in connection
with the competing exchange offer to Piper shareholders by Bangor Punta. A primary
issue in the case was whether or not a private right of action existed under § 14(e). In
granting a private right of action under § 14(e) the Chris-Craftcourt followed pre-'
viously developed principles under Rule 10b-5 regarding the elements of a private
action. 480 F.2d at 362. For this reason the court's analysis is persuasive authority for
Rule 10b-5 as well.
1Id. at 363 (citations omitted).
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Although Chris-Craft involved a private action under the tender
offer provisions of the Securities Exchange Act, the court relied extensively upon principles developed for determining liability under
Rule 10b-5.17 The court noted that the defendant Piper had failed to
disclose to outside shareholders the extent of its managing shareholders' financial interest in an exchange offer competing with ChrisCraft's tender offer. Piper had an affirmative duty to disclose this
material fact, the court held, based upon the special relationship
between the defendant and its investors, and Piper's superior access
to information." The duty imposed upon Piper was not limited to
disclosure, but also required the defendant to ascertain which facts
were material to the tender offer and counter offer, and to make a
reasonable effort to discover those facts. Thus, two distinct duties
were imposed under Rule 10b-5 by Chris-Craft: an affirmative duty
of disclosure, and a separate duty to ascertain or to use reasonable
diligence to discover material facts. The court did not, however, make
these duties the sole test of liability.
In addition to its formulation of duty under Rule 10b-5, the Second Circuit in Chris-Craftalso articulated a separate culpability requirement, stating that a knowing or reckless failure to discharge the
duty of disclosure would constitute sufficiently culpable conduct for
liability. 9 The culpability standard applied was essentially the same
standard of scienter previously used by the Second Circuit. 0 Hence,
v7Id.
"These factors as used by the Chris-Craftcourt did not represent any substantive
change in the law of Rule 10b-5. Material facts had previously been defined in the
circuit as facts which would affect a reasonable investor's decision to purchase or sell
securities. See note 6 supra. Special relationships of a fiduciary or confidential nature
have also been a basis for liability in securities fraud cases. See note 43 supra. The
problem of unequal access to information, in the form of unauthorized trading on
undisclosed corporate information was first addressed by In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,
40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), when Chairman Cary stated:
Analytically, the obligation to disclose inside information or forego
trading rests on two principal elements; first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended
to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal
benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved where
a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable
to those with whom he is dealing.
Id. at 912. See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 852 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (intent of Congress was to provide equal access to
information).
1g48 0 F.2d at 363. Compare this with the concurring opinion by Judge Gurfein. 480
F.2d at 398.
5See, e.g., Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d 115, 123 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
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imposition of liability in Chris-Craftwas contingent upon the defendants' breach of duty, and that this breach was at least knowing or
reckless."
The Second Circuit's articulation of liability primarily in terms
of a duty standard and a culpability requirement was a departure
from earlier judicial analysis which had relied upon the elements of
common law fraud as the basis for determining liability. Chris-Craft
did not, however, establish a broad duty standard for general application. The court did not specify which special relationships, aside from
the particular fact situation before it, would require affirmative duties of disclosure or investigation, or what other factors might be
relevent in determining the scope of the duty imposed upon the defendant. Nevertheless, while the court did not fully explain the implications of its duty standard, it did establish a new paradigm for
analyzing the issues and interests at stake in securities fraud litigation. The Second Circuit again used a duty analysis in a case" decided one month after Chris-Craft,thereby establishing a definitive
standard for the circuit. It remained uncertain whether other circuits
would follow, thus leading to general application of a duty standard
with its potential capacity for a major transformation of the substantive elements of liability.
White v. Abrams
The Ninth Circuit's adoption of a duty standard in White v.
414 U.S. 857 (1973). The Chris-Craftcourt rejected liability for a negligent breach of
duty by noting that the function of the scienter requirement was to confine imposition
of liability to those defendants whose conduct was sufficiently culpable to justify the
penalty sought. 480 F.2d at 362. The Chris-Craftcourt is one of the few courts to admit
candidly that one purpose of the scienter or culpability requirement is to protect
defendants from potentially enormous liability for merely negligent violations of Rule
lOb-5. Accord, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 866-67 (2d Cir. 1968),
(Friendly, J., concurring) cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (the consequences of holding that negligence in drafting a press release may impose civil liability on the corporation would fall upon holders of the corporation's stock and would defeat the objective
of full disclosure); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 804 (5th Cir. 1970) (courts have
sought to construct workable limits on liability which will accommodate the interests
of investors, the business community, and public generally). See also 2 BROMBERG, §
8.4 (508); Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind
in Rule 10b-5 Purchaseand Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. Rav. 423 (1968) (suggesting that
restitution damages in the Texas Gulf Sulphur litigation could amount to between $84
million and $390 million, depending upon the period selected in which recovery would
be allowed); Comment, The Role of Scienter and the Need to Limit Damages in Rule
10b-5 Actions-The Texas Gulf Sulphur Litigation, 59 Ky. L.J. 891 (1971).
11480 F.2d at 364.
"Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
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Abrams53 firmly established this analytical approach as the most
novel procedure for determining liability under Rule 10b-5. The case
arose out of the bankruptcy proceedings of the Richmond Corporations, a network of corporations controlled by Theodore Richmond.54
The defendant, Paul Abrams, was a friend of and financial advisor
to the plaintiffs, the White Group. 5 Although not a seller of securities, Abrams recommended and arranged for the White Group to
purchase stock and promissory notes of the Richmond Corporations,
for which he received commissions from Richmond. The White Group
charged Abrams with violating § 17(a) of the Securities Act,5" § 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act,57 Rule 10b-5, and with common law
fraud. The plaintiffs alleged that Abrams misrepresented that he had
investigated Richmond Corporations and its financial statements
and had found them to be sound; that the money would be used to
purchase new franchises and equipment; and that Richmond Corporations had large earnings which would enable it to pay high interest
rates on the loans. Abrams was also charged with failing to disclose
that he had received a large commission on each investment made
in Richmond Corporations through his efforts; that he had sold similar securities and notes with higher rates of return to other persons;
and that Manufacturers Credit Corporation, the controlling corporation, owned no assets other than stock in various Richmond controlled corporations. The jury found in favor of the plaintiffs on the
securities fraud claim, but found for the defendant on the common
law fraud claim.58
The particular point of appeal in White was a jury instruction
which would have imposed absolute liability upon the defendant.59
The court of appeals rejected an absolute liability standard, reversed
the verdict, and remanded the case for a new trial. In an opinion
-495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
"See Manufacturers Credit Corp. v. SEC, 395 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1968), for details
of the structure of Richmond Corporations and the bankruptcy proceedings.
I-T'he White Group included Mr. and Mrs. J. Arthur White, their daughter, and
friends who invested in Richmond Corporations through the defendant.
115 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1970).
5715 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
1495 F.2d at 726-28.
59
rlhe jury instruction provided:
If you find that defendant made a material misrepresentation to
plaintiffs in connection with the sale to plaintiffs of a promissory note
or share of stock, the law is that defendant has violated the Federal
securities laws even if you find that defendant did not know the falsity
of the misrepresentation he made to plaintiffs.
495 F.2d at 728. (emphasis added).
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written by Judge Wallace, the Ninth Circuit addressed three significant points. The court noted that some form of scienter was necessary
for recovery, and thereby rejected absolute liability under the rule."0
Nevertheless, Judge Wallace also proposed a standard of pleading
and proof necessary to establish a prima facie case,' as distinguished
from that proof necessary to prevail on the merits, which effectively
encompassed strict liability. Finally, a flexible duty standard was
established to govern liability in Rule 10b-5 litigation. 2
In establishing a flexible duty standard, the White court departed
in several fundamental respects from the Second Circuit's standard
as announced in Chris-Craft.The White court rejected any separate
consideration of duty and culpability, and suggested that liability
would be determined under a single duty test which included the
necessary degree of scienter.13 The Ninth Circuit also rejected the
Second Circuit minimum culpability standard. 4 Rather than establish a different minimum standard, the court proposed a variable
scienter concept that necessitated a determination of the requisite
degree of scienter on a case-by-case basis. The rejection of separate
duty and scienter tests in conjunction with variable scienter allowed
the court to formulate a flexible duty standard which encompassed
a greater spectrum of duty than that proposed in the Chris-Craft
case.' Similarly, White suggested a broader range of factors to be
utilized by the trial court in formulating the appropriate duty to
apply in a particular case. Thus, while White departed significantly
from Chris-Craft'sformulation of duty and limited scienter standard,
the White court's flexible duty standard greatly expanded the potential characterizations of duty imposed under Rule 1Ob-5 and the possible factors creating those duties.
The Standard of Pleading
Although White's substantive impact on Rule 10b-5 case law centers on the proposed flexible duty standard, more subtle consequences can be attributed to the court's clarification of the standard
of pleading and its rejection of strict liability. White v. Abrams was
the first Ninth Circuit case to review two earlier cases from that
circuit which dealt with the scienter requirement. The earlier cases,
11495 F.2d at 728, 734.
"Id. at 728-30.
"Id. at 730-36.
"Id. at 734-36.
"Id. at 732-33.
6Id. at 735-36.
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6
Ellis v. Carter"
and Royal Air Properties,Inc. v. Smith, 7 had been
cited by other circuit courts as authority for imposing a negligence"
or strict liability 9 standard under Rule 10b-5. Judge Wallace rejected
a strict liability interpretation of Ellis and Royal Air," and noted that
liability without fault was contrary to the basic thrust of § 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act and of the rule.7
In both Ellis and Royal Air the Ninth Circuit had ruled that it
was unnecessary to allege or prove common law fraud in an action
under § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5.1 Citing Ellis for authority, the Royal Air

66291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). Ellis involved a suit between joint venturers in a
plan to take over the management of Republic Pictures Corp. The plaintiff was induced to buy stock at a premium price from the defendant by the promise that the
shares would give the plaintiff a role in managing Republic. The plaintiff was subsequently excluded from management by the defendant and other parties to the fraud.
67312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962). A stock purchaser who was subsequently elected a
corporate officer sued the defendant corporation for misrepresentation and nondisclosure in violation of Rule 10b-5. The violation involved a stock prospectus which misstated anticipated return on investment and omitted mention of an outstanding corporate debt. The corporate defendant appealed from the trial court's disallowance of
equitable defenses. The appellate court sustained the defendant's appeal and remanded the case for a new trial.
"See, e.g., Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1305 (2d Cir. 1973); City Nat'l
Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 230 n.9 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905
(1970); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 747 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 951 (1968).
"See Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379-80 (10th Cir. 1965), citing Royal Air
Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962), and Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d
270 (9th Cir. 1961).
7495 F.2d at 734. In spite of White's limitation on Royal Air Properties, Inc. v.
Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962), and Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961),
the Tenth Circuit failed to reexamine its strict liability scienter standard in Kerbs v.
Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 739 n.6 (10th Cir. 1974), which reaffirmed Stevens
v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965) (not necessary to prove common law fraud;
must prove only one of the prohibited actions). Stevens cited Ellis and Royal Air as
authority for its strict liability holding. 343 F.2d at 379-80. It is noteworthy that
although the Tenth Circuit purports to impose a strict liability standard, it has yet to
impose liability for innocent misrepresentations or omissions of material fact in a
securities fraud case. See Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474
F.2d 514 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973) (due diligence defense and good
faith of defendant precluded liability for nondisclosure); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971) (liability based
on deceitful and fraudulent misrepresentation); Allen v. H.K. Porter Co., 452 F.2d 675
(10th Cir. 1971) (agreed basis for liability rested on knowing misstatement or omission
of a material fact). The Tenth Circuit has now rejected both negligence and strict
liability as adequate scienter for recovery under Rule 10b-5. Clegg v. Conk, CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP. T 94,897 (10th Cir. Dec. 5, 1974).
71495 F.2d at 728.
"2 The court in Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961), stated:
Section 10(b) speaks in terms of the use of "any manipulative device
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court had stated that "Rule 10b-5(b) . . . only requires proof of a
material misstatement or an omission of a material fact in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security to make out a prima facie
case. 7' 3 While stating that allegations or proof of common law fraud
were unnecessary, 74 Ellis had not otherwise explained what standard
should be applied to the pleadings or to ultimate proof of liability.75
Royal Air, on the other hand, established a standard of pleading and
proof of a prima facie case which required merely an alleged violation
7
of the rule by the defendant, and no particular averment of scienter. 1
Noting that neither case was a decision on the merits, 77 the White
or contrivance"

.

. .

. Had Congress intended to [proscribe]

common-law fraud, it would probably have said so. We see no reason
to go beyond the plain meaning of the word "any", indicating that the
use of manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances of whatever
kind may be forbidden, to construe the statute as if it read "any
fraudulent" devices.
Id. at 274, quoted in White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 1974). The Ellis court
also rejected the defendants' claim that explicit provisions for liability in the Securities
Act limited Rule 10b-5 by stating that Congress in effect nullified limits established
on private actions under the Securities Act when it passed § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act one year later. 291 F.2d at 274.
7312 F.2d at 212, quoted in White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 1974).
"See note 72 supra.
7"Other courts have cited Ellis as establishing a negligence standard, see note 68
supra, or a strict liability standard, Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379-80 (10th Cir.
1965). At best, the holding in Ellis can be characterized as rejecting the necessity for
allegation and proof of common law fraud by the plaintiff in Rule 10b-5 cases. See note
72 supra. The Ninth Circuit subsequently reaffirmed this principle in Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962). But the statement that common
law fraud or scienter need not be proved in Rule 10b-5 cases does not necessarily mean
that negligence or strict liability will suffice. This distinction is a common problem in
many cases which are interpreted as establishing a strict liability or negligence standard under Rule 10b-5. Only a few cases contain language which clearly implies a
standard of strict liability. See Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 747 (8th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968) (Rule 10b-5 includes even innocent disclosures which may
amount to manipulative or deceptive conduct); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379
(10th Cir. 1965) (only necessary to prove one of the prohibited actions). Contra White
v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 728 (9th Cir. 1974) (rejecting liability without fault). Similarly, only a handful of cases have applied a negligence standard under Rule 10b-5
using the term negligence. Blakely v. Lisac, 357 F. Supp. 255 (D. Ore. 1972), appeal
pending, 9th Cir., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 73,031; Batchelor v. Legg & Co., 52 F.R.D.
545 (D. Md. 1971). See also note 70 supra.
"See text accompanying note 73 supra.
"See Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962) (appealing
disallowance of equitable defenses at trial), aff'd, 333 F.2d 568 (1964) (judgment for
plaintiff after second trial); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961) (reversing
dismissal on pleadings), aff'd, 328 F.2d 573 (1964) (affirming trial court dismissal after
plaintiff's presentation of evidence).
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Court stated that those decisions did not establish the proper standard for liability. The court concluded, however, that they denoted
the proper standard for pleading and for stating a prima facie case
under Rule 10b-5. These standards were not to be misconstrued as
the standard for liability. Judge Wallace explained: "[iln Rule 10b5 cases, where much of the evidence needed by the plaintiff to prove
his case is in the hands of the defendant, we require a lesser amount
of evidence to avoid a directed verdict or dismissal at the end of the
plaintiff's case than we require for a final judgment.""8
A liberal pleading policy for Rule 10b-5 cases is not innovative in
view of the theory behind the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that
pleadings should be construed to do substantial justice." In the case
of fraud, however, the rules require particular pleading of the circumstances and facts constituting the fraud." The implication of White's
reliance on Royal Air is that no allegation of scienter will be necessary
to satisfy the particularity requirement of the federal rules. In other
words, the standard to be applied to pleadings and prima facie proof
81
is one of strict liability.
The effect of this strict liability standard was not unintentional;
Judge Wallace noted that cross-examination of the defendant's witnesses may enable the plaintiff to strengthen his case sufficiently to
prove the degree of scienter required for final judgment. 2 Thus, the
ultimate impact of White's pre-judgment strict liability standard will
be to encourage Rule 10b-5 litigation. White effectively forecloses any
11495 F.2d at 729-30.
7

See

FED.

R. Crv. P. 8(f); C.

WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE-LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS,

§ 68 (2d ed. 1970).
8"FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, §
68, at 289 (2d ed. 1970).
"Accord, Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379 n.3 (10th Cir. 1965). The Second
Circuit, to the contrary, requires pleading of some form of scienter or culpability
amounting at least to knowledge or recklessness. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 495 F.2d 228 (2d
Cir. 1974) (no claim stated absent allegation of scienter, intent to defraud, reckless
disregard for the truth, or knowledge); Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d
442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971) (complaint dismissed absent allegations of scienter, intent,
recklessness or knowledge); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969) (complaint dismissed, no knowledge).
8'Judge Wallace stated:
[I]t is inadvisable to sustain a defendant's motion to dismiss midway
through the trial, even though technically the plaintiff may not have
yet developed sufficient evidence for a final judgment, since as the
defendant proceeds with his case, the plaintiff may well on crossexamination be able to develop points that will strengthen his case.
495 F.2d at 730.
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dismissal based on a lack of scienter until all the evidence has been
heard, thereby enabling plaintiffs to force a trial on the merits
through all stages short of final judgment without any allegation or
proof of scienter. These procedural developments, however, assume
less immediate importance in light of the proposed standard of liability.
The Flexible Duty Standard
The rejection of strict liability under Rule 10b-5 and the limitation of Ellis and Royal Air enabled the White court to formulate a
new standard of liability in the light of recent case law development.
The White court relied principally on two recent cases" and found
that a duty analysis was the correct approach to determining liability
under the rule. The court regarded as particularly persuasive the
rationale used by the Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States.1 Instead of relying on the Court's holding in Affiliated
Ute Citizens,8" the White court examined the analysis employed and
noted that "the Court did not analyze the defendants' conduct in
'7rhe conclusion that dismissal will be avoided assumes, of course, that the plaintiff has made a reasonable showing of materiality, causation, damages, interstate
commerce, and a connection with the purchase or sale of a security.
'"Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
A406 U.S. 128 (1972). Plaintiffs sued a bank and two employees under Rule lOb-5
for fraud in effecting the sale of shares of stock in a corporation formed to supervise
the distribution of certain tribal assets under the Ute Partition Act. The Court held
both the bank and employees liable, stating that their failure to disclose their market
maker status and the prevailing market price at which they were reselling shares to
non-Indian investors violated Rule lob-5. Under the circumstances of the case, which
involved nondisclosure, positive proof of reliance was not a prerequisite to recovery. It
was necessary to show that facts withheld were material in the sense that a reasonable
investor might have considered them important in making his decision to sell. This
obligation to disclose and the withholding of a material fact established the requisite
element of causation in fact. Id. at 153-54. The facts of the case indicated actual
knowledge on the part of the defendants, but the Court failed to comment upon any
scienter requirement or what minimum degree of scienter would be necessary for liability.
"The Affiliated Ute Citizens case was doubtful authority for White. As Judge
Wallace acknowledged, Affiliated Ute Citizens did not involve the scope of duty imposed by clause (b) of Rule lOb-5. Id. at 152-53. The issue on appeal in White was a
jury instruction, see note 59 supra, which, the defendant successfully argued, improperly defined the scope of duty imposed by Rule 10b-5(b). Reliance on the Affiliated
Ute Citizens case was not misplaced, however, in that Judge Wallace relied on the
factors the Court used in finding a duty of disclosure, rather than the holding of the
case.
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terms of the elements of common law fraud, but rather as what kind
of a duty rule 10b-5 imposes.""7 Drawing upon Affiliated Ute Citizens,
the White court proposed five factors to be considered in defining the
extent of the duty imposed upon a particular defendant:
1. The relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff;88
2. the defendant's access to the information as compared
to the plaintiff's access;"8
17495 F.2d at 731. (footnote omitted).
"Id. at 735. The White court cited as supporting this factor Vine v. Beneficial Fin.
Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d
270 (9th Cir. 1961); and Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673
(N.D. Ind. 1966) (motion to dismiss denied), 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind. 1968) (on
merits), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970). 495 F.2d
at 735 n.16. Vine concerned shareholders of different classes of stock, the defendant
corporation having secured approval of an allegedly unfair merger through nonplaintiff
stockholders. Plaintiff shareholders were left in the position of forced sellers for less
than fair value. Ellis concerned alleged fraud between joint venturers. In Brennan,
purchasers of stock sued defendant-issuer, Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., as an
aider-abettor to Rule lOb-5 violations committed by the broker, who had become
bankrupt without delivering stock certificates it had sold. Denying defendant's motion
to dismiss, the court said that the statute and rule impose a duty on those with superior
access to information not to take advantage of it. 259 F. Supp. at 681. In view of the
special relationship between the corporation and its shareholders, the defendant-issuer
had an affirmative duty to report the improper activities of its broker. Failure to do
so subjected it to liability as an aider-abettor. Id. at 682. In securities fraud litigation
courts have generally recognized that certain relationships create a duty of disclosure
between plaintiff and defendant. See, e.g., Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d
1202 (9th Cir. 1970) (customer's action against broker for churning); Hanly v. SEC,
415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969) (customer-broker); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th
Cir. 1963) (statute created a form of fiduciary duty between insiders and outsiders
when they dealt in corporate securities); Ruszkowski v. Hugh Johnson & Co., 302 F.
Supp. 1371 (W.D.N.Y. 1969) (rumor not material, no violation of broker duty to customer). See also .Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1317 (2d Cir. 1973) (Hays, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
114 9 5 F.2d at 735. The access factor has been important in cases involving insider
trading. The rationale is that when an insider obtains information intended for corporate purposes by virtue of his position, it is inherently unfair for him to take advantage
of that information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing. See
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 405 F.2d 200 (2d
Cir.), modified, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). The
White court cites Schoenbaum as authority for access as a factor in determining the
defendant's duty under Rule 10b-5. Some commentators have said that insider trading on undisclosed information should not be unlawful because there is no causal connection between nondisclosure and an unknowing seller's decision to sell. The injury
to investors, they note, is no greater because of insider trading on undisclosed information. Courts have uniformly rejected this theory. Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 315 F. Supp. 42, 44 (D. Colo. 1970), rev'd on othergrounds,
474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973). The Second Circuit also
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3. the benefit that the defendant derives from the relationship;"
4. the defendant's awareness of whether the plaintiff was
relying on their relationship in making his investment decisions;9 and,
rejected this theory, saying that anyone in possession of inside information either must
disclose it to the investing public, or if he cannot disclose, must abstain from trading.
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969); accord, Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 353 F.
Supp. 264, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 495 F.2d 228, 236 (2d Cir. 1974).
"495 F.2d at 735. The White court cited Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,
406 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1972) for this guideline. 495 F.2d at 735 n.18. Benefit has not
played an important role as such in the rationale of securities fraud cases, but in
Affiliated Ute Citizens, the fact that the defendants were market makers in the sale
of shares seems to have been important to the Court. Other courts have considered
benefit to the defendant in terms of reducing the standard of actionable conduct when
defendants are acting in their own self interest to the detriment of the plaintiff's
interest. See Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 287 (3d Cir.)
(Adams, J., concurring and dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972); Kramer v.
Scientific Control Corp., 365 F. Supp. 780, 791 n.14 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Globus, Inc. v.
Jaroff, 266 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
11495 F.2d at 735. In Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill.
1967), a defendant accountant who certified a false financial statement was denied
dismissal of the complaint against him because he knew the statement would be
directed at the investing public. Id. at 104. The Drake court thought it important that
certified public accountants have assumed a special relationship to the investing public and should not be immunized from suit for fraud. Id. This is the only authority cited
by the White court for the factor of a defendant's awareness of plaintiffs reliance on
the relationship. 495 F.2d at 735-36 n.19. This reliance should not be confused with
the reliance element of common law fraud, which was curtailed by the Supreme Court
in Affiliated Ute Citizens: In that case the Court reversed a lower court decision which
required evidence of reliance on a misrepresentation of material fact. Under the circumstances, which involved nondisclosure, the Court stated that positive proof of
reliance was not a prerequisite for recovery. See note 85 supra. See also Mitchell v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 102-03 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004
(1971) (plaintiffs selling shares in reliance on a misleading press release denied recovery when sold seven days after misleading release corrected). The Ninth Circuit declined to hold an accountant liable under Rule lob-5 for a misleading prospectus where
there were discrepancies between a financial statement and the prospectus. Wessel v.
Buhler, 437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971). The court denied the plaintiffs claim that the
accountant, who admittedly had prepared false financial statements, had a duty to
prospective investors to disclose knowledge of the corporation's irregular finances. "We
find nothing in Rule lob-5 that purports to impose liability on anyone whose conduct
consists solely of inaction." Id. at 283. Wessel can be distinguished from Drake, however, by the fact that the false financial statements were not prepared in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities. Nor was there any evidence that the plaintiffs
had ever seen the statements before purchasing the securities, thereby negating any
causal connection between the accountant's conduct and the plaintiffs injury. Id. at
282.
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5. the defendant's activity in initiating the securities
2
transaction in question.
These factors do not suggest a "but for" test to determine whether
a duty may be imposed upon the defendant. Instead of proposing the
factors as quantitative indicators of duty, the White court applied
them to define the quality of the relationship between plaintiff and
defendant in any given case. The court did not specify how the factors
should be weighed in determining what special relationship would
create a particular duty,93 but offered two examples to explain their
relation to the duty imposed:
Where the defendant derives great benefit from a relationship
of extreme trust and confidence with the plaintiff, the defendant knowing that plaintiff completely relies upon him for
information to which he has ready access, but to which plaintiff was no access, the law imposes a duty upon the defendant
to use extreme care in assuring that all material information
is accurate and disclosed. . . . On the other hand, where the
defendant's relationship with the plaintiff is so casual that a
reasonably prudent person would not rely upon it in making
investment decisions, the defendant's only duty is not to misrepresent intentionally material facts. 4
These examples, together with explicit language in the case, indicate
"1495 F.2d at 735-36. This factor seems most relevant to cases involving customerbroker suits. Two courts have denied recovery to customers initiating transactions.
Canizaro v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 370 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. La. 1974), appealpending, 5th
Cir., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 73,031; Ruszkowski v. Hugh Johnson & Co., 302 F. Supp.
1371 (W.D.N.Y. 1969). In establishing this element the White court followed one
commentator's suggestion that this factor explained results which courts had reached
in two conflicting cases. See Mann, Rule 10b-5: Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct
to Replace the Catch Phrasesof Negligence and Scienter,45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1206, 121920 (1970). The court distinguished O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964), in
which the CAB ordered a reexchange of stock between two airlines at a ratio unfavorable to the plaintiff's corporation, from Ruckle v. Roto American Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d
Cir. 1964), in which directors actively participated in the issue and sale of new shares
to perpetuate themselves in control of the corporation. 495 F.2d at 736 n.20. The White
court similarly characterized Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 266 F. Supp. 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
which held that a corporate derivative suit properly alleged fraud or deceit in the
issuance of a proxy statement concerning a stock option plan which greatly benefited
directors and in which they actively participated. Id. at 531.
"White suggested one consideration in weighing the factors. "In making this determination the court should focus on the goals of the securities fraud legislation .
495 F.2d at 735.
"Id. at 736.
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that both duty and scienter are flexible concepts to be applied in
varying degrees in different cases." What the court did not make
explicit, but what is essential to an understanding of the functioning
of the standard, is the distinction between flexible duty and variable
scienter.
The examples offered by the court distinguish between two
different duties: a duty of disclosure and a duty of nonmisrepresentation. They further suggest that where a special relationship is present, disclosure is required. The factors present in the
first example indicate a close and confidential relationship between
the parties. Confidential or fiduciary relationships have traditionally
given rise to duties of fair dealing, good faith, and full and fair disclosure of all material facts by the fiduciary." Similarly, when such a
confidential relationship involves a securities transaction, Rule 10b5 imposes a concurrent quasi-fiduciary duty of disclosure. On the
other hand, when the quality of the relationship is casual and factors
indicating trust and confidence are not present, the only duty imposed may be to refrain from misrepresenting material facts. 7
The courts have also imposed a third duty, aside from disclosure
or non-misrepresentation. When a special or confidential relationship
exists, the duty has not been discussed solely as one of disclosure, but
includes a duty to investigate and ascertain material facts as well. 8
Such a duty of investigation was recognized by the Second Circuit in
the Chris-Craft case and by the White court as well. That court
stated that "the duty to investigate and disclose material facts will
' 5See notes 100 & 102 infra.
"See H. HEN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORIONS, § 235 (2d ed. 1970); W.
PRossER, HANDBOOK OF TH LAW OF ToRS, § 106 (4th ed. 1971).
"A distinction between misrepresentation and nondisclosure is also supported by
the text of the rule. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-53
(1972). Contra,List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811 (1965). See also Epstein, The Scienter Requirement in Actions UnderRule 10b-5,
48 N.C. L. REv. 482 (1970); Comment, Negligent MisrepresentationUnder Rule 10b5, 32 U. Cm. L. REv. 824 (1965). Clauses (a) and (c) of the rule are broad prohibitions
against fraud or practices which would operate as a fraud, see note 1 supra, proscribing
both misrepresentation and nondisclosure. See Affiliated Ute Citizens, supra at 15253. Clause (b), however, only prohibits untrue statements or omissions of material fact
"necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (1973). Hence,
clause (b) requires some statement to be operative, and thereby prohibits only misrepresentations or omissions made in connection with some affirmative representation,
and not pure nondisclosure.
"See White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 732 (9th Cir. 1974); Chris-Craft Indus. Inc.
v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); Lanza
v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
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necessarily vary according to the fact situation."99 What should be
clearly understood, then, is that three distinct duties may be imposed
under Rule 10b-5: a duty not to misrepresent, an affirmative duty of
disclosure, and a duty to investigate and ascertain material facts.
Thus, when speaking of a flexible duty standard, White indicated
that Rule 10b-5 does not impose a single duty of disclosure, but may
impose any or all of these duties upon the defendant, depending upon
the facts of the case. In a casual relationship, the only duty may be
to refrain from misrepresentation. In a confidential relationship, however, the duty will be to investigate, ascertain, and disclose material
facts, with an implicit duty not to misrepresent.
The White court did not articulate the flexible duty standard
solely in terms of duty. Rather than formulate the duty only as that
of disclosure, investigation or abstention from misrepresentation, the
court also defined the nature of the duty imposed in terms of the
degree of scienter required for liability. This dual characterization
incorporated scienter into the flexible duty standard instead of treating duty and scienter as separate elements.' 0 Arguably this single test
which incorporates scienter is indistinguishable from the two-step
duty and culpability standard of the Second Circuit since both questions must be determined whichever test is applied. The White court,
however, rejected the Second Circuit's duty theory which "set a lower
limit on the duty by requiring more than negligent conduct for liability,"'' and concluded that any single standard of scienter was unworkable.1 0 2 Judge Wallace's illustrations further suggested that
when a confidential relationship is present, negligence may be the
appropriate scienter standard. On the other hand, when the relation11495 F.2d at 736.
101The court's rejection of any single degree of scienter as the standard of liability
did not foreclose all consideration of scienter. In summarizing the flexible duty standard, Judge Wallace said:
While rejecting scienter and state of mind concepts as the standard
itself, [the flexible duty standard] requires the court to consider state
of mind as an important factor in determining the scope of duty that
rule 10b-5 imposes.

Id.
'°'Id. at 733.
" Judge Wallace stated:
We believe that the cases and commentators demonstrate that any
attempt to limit the scope of duty in all 10b-5 cases by the use of one
standard for state of mind or scienter is confusing and unworkable.
Consequently, we reject scienter or any other discussion of state of
mind as a necessary and separate element of a 10b-5 action.
Id. at 734 (footnotes omitted).
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ship is only casual, an intentional breach of duty may be necessary
for liability.
White was the first case to propose that scienter should be a
variable factor in determining liability under Rule 10b-5. All other
courts which have adopted a scienter standard have indicated that
liability should be uniformly imposed for more than negligent conduct. 0 3Thus, when a negligent breach of duty is sufficient for imposition of liability under the White flexible duty standard, a less stringent standard than that of circuits requiring recklessness will effectively be applied. On the other hand when, under the White analysis,
a knowing breach of duty is required, recovery will be more difficult
than under the minimum recklessness standard applied by other circuit courts.
The Second Circuit, unlike the Ninth, established a duty standard in Chris-Craft,but retained the scienter requirement of reckless
or knowing conduct as a separate test of liability.' 4 Although White
suggested a single liability test of duty which includes scienter, ChrisCraft posed a two step analysis. The fundamental distinction between the two circuits is the degree of scienter required. The Second
Circuit imposed liability upon proof of reckless, knowing, or intentional conduct, thereby establishing a minimum recklessness standard for all cases.' 5 The Ninth Circuit, however, rejected any minimum standard as applicable in all instances and announced a variable standard to be applied on a case-by-case basis.'
The scienter distinction added a further dimension to the duty
standard posed in Chris-Craft and adopted by White. The Second
Circuit duty standard was formulated in terms of investigation and
disclosure, while the White standard suggested a broader approach
to duty, encompassing non-misrepresentation as well. The White
court's additional inclusion of a variable scienter requirement within
the duty test created a standard broader and more flexible than that
of the Second Circuit, and thus more suitable for application to the
varied factual contexts of Rule 10b-5 cases. Both courts noted that
unequal access to information and existence of a special relationship
between plaintiff and defendant may impose an affirmative duty to
disclose material facts under Rule 10b-5. White provided three additional guidelines to determine the precise scope of the duty imposed,
giving trial courts a broader basis for determining duty. Thus, the
'1See notes 24-28 supra.
'"See text accompanying notes 47-51 supra.
"'See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra.
'See text accompanying notes 101-02 supra.
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flexible duty standard adds a significant perspective to the Second
Circuit's standard by more fully articulating what particular duties
may be imposed under the rule and by indicating what additional
factors may create various duties.
The Workability of the Standard
The White court's approach to duty and scienter will permit trial
courts to exercise broad discretion in determining liability under Rule
10b-5. Whereas prior to White the scienter requirement generally had
been fulfilled by proof of negligence or recklessness, White has established that no particular definition of scienter is appropriate in all
cases. Courts implementing the flexible duty standard, after reviewing the facts of each case in light of White's five factors, will be free
to determine the nature of the duty imposed. However, this determination is made more difficult by the White court's failure to explain
the weight to be given any of the factors it enumerated to assist in
determining the duty standard." 7 This failure to provide additional
guidance beyond the two illustrations leaves trial courts following
White free to determine from previous decisions the relative importance of each factor in a particular situation.
If trial courts, in attempting to find more specific guidance, mechanically apply the results obtained by earlier courts in similar situations, the duty standards derived may include a de facto uniform
scienter standard. 0 1 Such a result would not only contravene White's
premise that a single scienter standard is unworkable, but would
force upon trial courts the rigidity and inflexibility which the White
court sought to alleviate. Nor would such a development be desirable.
A major advantage of the White duty standard is that it provides a
flexible framework within which courts can analyze and assess liability in Rule 10b-5 cases. Without rigid scienter standards determining
liability in all situations, it will be unnecessary for courts to manipulate duty concepts to avoid liability for conduct which is greater than
negligent but arguably does not merit imposition of liability. 5° This
" t Judge Wallace also noted that additions or adaptations could be made to the
enumerated factors when applying them to a particular case. 495 F.2d at 735.
'"Since all other circuit courts would find liability under Rule 10b-5 for conduct
greater than negligence, see notes 24-26 supra, implicit within their holdings is a single
minimum scienter standard of liability.
"'Compare the majority opinion with the dissenting opinions in Lanza v. Drexel
& Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973). The majority opinion characterized the defendant's duty as one to investigate a stock transaction and convey material adverse
information to the prospective purchasers. Id. at 1289. The director was not held liable
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does not mean, however, that earlier cases will be totally disregarded.
Trial courts which attempt to articulate precisely the requirements
for recovery will be influenced by earlier cases in choosing and attaching importance to the factors which create the requisite duty and
state of mind for liability.
Of the five factors indicative of duty which were suggested by
Judge Wallace,"' three primarily characterize the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant: the benefit the defendant derives from the relationship, awareness of the plaintiffs reliance, and the defendant's initiation of the transaction. Each of these
factors is important in varying degrees to the determination of liability. For example, the defendant need not benefit from the relationship or transaction to be held liable."' Failure to disclose a benefit
or interest in the purchase or sale of securities violates Rule 10b-5,"2
3
but lack of such interest is not a bar to recovery by the plaintiff.1
Likewise, awareness by the defendant that the plaintiff may rely on
the relationship or the defendant's expertise is not dispositive of the
liability issue,"' although sometimes it is considered by the court."'
Finally, evaluating the defendant's conduct in initiating the transaction is significant only in certain factual situations,"6 primarily those
involving confidential relations between parties to the suit. While
none of the three factors are individually dispositive of liability in an
isolated context, together they characterize the extent of the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, which was another factor
proposed by Judge Wallace. Thus, within the special relationship
context, the factors assume collective importance, and in this context
any one of these four factors may become determinative of liability.
under Rule 10b-5 for his negligent failure to investigate and convey the information.
Id. at 1309. Two dissenting opinions were filed. One characterized the director's conduct as reckless, thus meeting the Second Circuit's scienter standard of liability. Id.
at 1320. The other dissent found the director's conduct negligent, which, in the judge's
opinion, was sufficient for liability. Id. at 1317-19.
"'See text accompanying notes 88-92 supra.
"'See note 90 supra.
"'Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-54 (1972) (defendants
had affirmative duty to disclose fact that they were market makers); accord, Chasins
v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d Cir. 1970).
"'See, e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 100-03 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
"'Compare Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971), with Drake v. Thor
Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1967). See also note 91 supra.
"'See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Chasins
v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
"'See note 92 supra.
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Unequal access to information, the fifth factor used by the White
court, is frequently, although not exclusively, found in special relationships. The access factor by itself has been more influential than
the first three factors in the determination of liability. When a plaintiff has the same access to material information as the defendant, no
duty of disclosure is required even where a fiduciary relationship
exists." 7 But trading with knowledge of undisclosed information,
which is not equally available to the injured parties, violates the
rule. 1 8 Consequently, the access factor is dispositive of liability in
only one manner: equal access bars recovery when the information is
not disclosed to the plaintiff.
All of the factors proposed in White are considerations which define the quality of the relationship between plaintiff and defendant.
This relationship is in reality a function of the other four factors, and9
was one reason for imposing a duty of disclosure in both Chris-Craft
and White. 110 Hence, an examination of those Rule 10b-5 cases which
have involved a special relationship between parties may illustrate
the interplay of White's guidelines in determining the required duty
in particular cases.
One traditionally special relationship-that between stockbroker
and customer-exemplifies the duty standard as imposed concurrently by quasi-fiduciary principles and Rule 10b-5. Even before private actions were granted under Rule 10b-5, stockbrokers were held
to high standards of duty toward customers.'2 ' Thus, when a broker
made recommendations to his customer, the customer could justifiably assume that the broker had made a reasonable investigation of
material facts, had a reasonable basis for his recommendation, and
had disclosed any lack of information and risks arising therefrom.',
This traditional quasi-fiduciary duty was incorporated into the duty
imposed by Rule 10b-5, which proscribed fraudulent practices in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities, making the fidu"TArber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 420 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 43
U.S.L.W. 3202 (Oct. 15, 1974).
"'Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264, 276
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 495 F.2d 228, 236 (2d Cir. 1974); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
"'See text accompanying note 46 supra.
"'Seetext accompanying note 88 supra.
2
' See Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321
U.S. 786 (1944).
'2Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 597 (2d Cir. 1969).
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ciary duty owed to the customer co-extensive with the duty imposed
by the rule.'1
In applying these co-extensive duties to brokers, courts have held
that when a broker had discretionary power to buy or sell for a customer's account, failure to disclose the extent of excessive purchases
and sales effected to generate brokerage commissions subjected him
to liability under Rule 10b-5.'2 4 Similarly, failure of a broker to disclose the fact that he was a market maker'2 in the securities he
recommended to his customer, knowing the customer would rely on
his recommendation, also violated the rule.2 6 Both of these instances
illustrate situations in which all five factors enumerated by the White
court are present: (1) an extremely close relationship between customer and broker; (2) better broker access to information than the
plaintiffs access; (3) benefit to the broker in commissions from purchases or sales; (4) the broker's knowledge that the plaintiff would
rely on the advice given, or the broker's expertise, in making investment decisions; and, (5) the broker either initiating the transaction
or making a recommendation to his customer. Presence of all the
White court's factors suggests a duty of disclosure imposed upon the
broker by Rule 10b-5, and a breach of that duty when he failed to
disclose the extent of trading or his self interest in the transaction.
On the other hand, a broker who characterized information as a
rumor to a plaintiff who was a knowledgeable investor and who initiated the transaction, -wasnot liable under Rule 10b-5 for misrepresentation or nondisclosure.'2 In that instance nonliability was predicated upon the fact that the information disclosed was not material.
However, in terms of duty, the result could also be rationalized as a
finding that the broker fulfilled his duty of disclosure by calling the
information a rumor. The customer, being a sophisticated investor,
assumed the risk of unreliability when he purchased the security
mSee, e.g., Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 846-47 (E.D.
Va. 1968).
"'Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1209 (9th Cir. 1970); Stevens v.
Abbott, Proctor & Paine, 288 F. Supp. 836, 845-46 (E.D. Va. 1968). Significantly,
however, courts which have allowed recovery under Rule 10b-5 have not granted recovery for the concurrent common law fraud claim. See, e.g., White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d
724, 727 (9th Cir. 1974) (jury found defendant guilty of violating Rule 10b-5, but not
guilty of common law fraud); Stevens v. Abbott, Proctor & Paine, supra, at 847-48
(dismissing common law fraud claim absent clear, cogent and convincing evidence).
"'A market maker is a dealer who holds himself out as willing to buy and sell for
his own account on a continual basis. S.E.C. Rule 17a-9(f)(1). 17 C.F.R. 240.17a-9(f)(1)
(1974).
'"'Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
1Cf. Ruszkowski v. Hugh Johnson & Co., 302 F. Supp. 1371 (W.D.N.Y. 1969).
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knowing that the information was potentially inaccurate.
Similarly, when a plaintiff who was an experienced speculator
provided a broker only one day to investigate and make a recommendation concerning the purchase of a security from a third party, no
recovery was allowed for the broker's negligence in making the investigation.'1 The broker, who did not positively recommend the security to the plaintiff, had failed to discover and disclose that the security had been offered at less than the asked price a short time earlier.
Additionally, he had neither discovered that the seller's broker was
no longer in business, nor had he consulted the stock offering circular.
Under the circumstances, it was held that the broker had fulfilled his
duty to investigate. Finally, several cases have held that a broker who
merely acts as the customer's agent in executing orders to purchase
or sell has a minimal duty.' 9
These instances suggest the manner in which factors enumerated
in White may be utilized to determine the specific duty imposed by
Rule 10b-5. When the relationship between customer and broker is
"confidential," and the customer places considerable reliance upon
the broker's actions or recommendations, a duty to disclose fully all
material facts will be imposed on the broker. When the broker discloses the material fact that the information is merely a rumor, the
disclosure duty is fulfilled. A negligent failure to investigate and disclose information, however, does not violate the duty imposed by the
rule when the customer fails to allow sufficient time for adequate
investigation. And when a customer-broker relationship is casual and
the broker merely executes the customer's orders, the duty to the
customer is minimal, perhaps requiring only disclosure of known adverse material facts.
In all these instances, as the nature of the relationship tends toward an arms-length transaction, the duty imposed decreases from a
duty to exercise due care in investigating and disclosing material
facts to a duty only to disclose known facts. Similarly, although some
factors not suggested by the White court had been considered in these
cases,' 0 a rough scale of descending duty and scienter can be per'uCanizaro v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 370 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. La. 1974), appealpending,
5th Cir., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 73,031.
1'Id. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, [1969-1970
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,748 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
'"The due diligence of the plaintiff to avoid the fraud or consequences of the
misrepresentation or nondisclosure has been increasingly scrutinized by courts before
allowing recovery under Rule lOb-5. See, e.g., Clement A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine,
434 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 988 (1971); Canizaro v. Kohlmeyer
& Co., 370 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. La. 1974), appeal pending, 5th Cir., CCH FED. Sac. L.
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ceived as the relationship varies from confidential to arms-length.
Not all Rule 10b-5 cases, however, involve the type of fiduciary
relationship which exists between customer and broker. The traditional fiduciary duties of brokers to customers suggest that negligence
may be an appropriate standard of scienter in certain cases. But when
the relationship is one which has not normally justified imposition of
a negligence standard, as that between corporation and shareholder,1 3' fiduciary principles applied in customer-broker cases do not
form an adequate basis for imposing duties under Rule 10b-5. Considerations which govern confidential relations, such as privity, the benefit the defendant receives from the relationship, or the defendant's
action in initiating the transaction are less important when suits
involve corporate or private purchasers of securities on national markets.
The Chris-Craftcase 32 provides one example of the application of
duty in a non-fiduciary situation. That case involved a failure to
disclose to Piper shareholders the personal financial interest of the
corporation's inside shareholders in a counter offer to a takeover bid
by Chris-Craft. Noting that a special relationship may create a duty
to disclose material facts, the Second Circuit stated that, on the facts
of the case, corporate insiders had a special responsibility to be
meticulous and precise in their representations to shareholders concerning tender offers.'3 Thus, the Chris-Craftcourt apparently found
a special relationship between the corporation and its stockholders
which, under Rule 10b-5, required disclosure of all material facts in
transactions involving purchase or sale of securities, but with a predetermined scienter standard of at least reckless or knowing conduct.
Under these circumstances, factors important in determining liability included the undisclosed benefit to inside corporate shareholders, the materiality of this fact to outside shareholders who were
receiving the tender offer and counter offer, and the inside shareholders' activities in supporting the counter offer to Chris-Craft's takeover
bid. While these considerations can be articulated to approximate the
White court's principles governing scope of duty, they do not reflect
73,031; Ruszkowski v. Hugh Johnson & Co., 302 F. Supp. 1371 (W.D.N.Y. 1969).
In some cases, lack of due diligence by the plaintiff has prevented his recovery. See,
e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 103 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1004 (1971) (plaintiffs selling shares more than one week after full disclosure
of material facts denied recovery); Branham v. Material Sys. Corp., 354 F. Supp. 1048
(S.D. Fla. 1973).
"'See H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS, § § 235, 240 (2d ed. 1970).
"'See text accompanying notes 44-51 supra.
'-489 F.2d at 364-65.
REP.
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the traditional interests of trust and confidence present in a fiduciary
situation.
The particular duty imposed by Rule 10b-5 is co-extensive with
the broker's fiduciary duty to his customer. When, however, the traditional special relationship is not present, the duty imposed and the
factors which will create the duty should be derived from the rule and
not from principles formulated to govern fiduciaries or brokers. Thus,
courts following White must make the transition from duties arising
out of fiduciary relations to duties created exclusively by Rule 10b5.134 Implicit in these duties will be a requisite degree of scienter for
liability, which must also be determined by the trial court. While the
White court did not suggest what standards will be appropriate in all
cases, it provided an analytical framework which may result in less
"'Rather than rely on fiduciary principles as a guide for the duty and degree of
scienter to impose upon a defendant, courts must derive a duty from the rule which
will govern situations involving corporate defendants and private investors in national
securities markets. A duty not to misrepresent can be derived from the rule with no
difficulty, since misrepresentation is fraudulent conduct which the rule clearly forbids.
But when the duty involves investigation and disclosure, more difficult questions are
involved. Full and fair disclosure of material facts is one object of the federal securities
laws. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (a fundamental
purpose was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat
emptor); Popkin v. Bishop, 464 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1972). Although full disclosure should
fulfill the duty imposed by Rule 10b-5, precisely when disclosure is required is a matter
of debate. See Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514,
518 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973) (release of information is a matter of
corporate discretion); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 99 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971) (did not decide if there was any duty to disclose,
but what was said was fraudulent). A defendant trading securities on undisclosed
information violates Rule 10b-5. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912
(1961). From these cases has emerged a corporate discretion defense in nondisclosure
cases, provided the corporate defendant is not trading in his own securities. See Bromberg, Are There Limits to Rule 10b-5?, 29 Bus. LAW. 167, 168 (1974). A duty to
investigate further complicates the problem. A defendant could disclose all known
facts, but recklessly or negligently fail to investigate and disclose additional facts
which are material to the transaction. When the breach of duty is reckless, knowledge
can be imputed to the defendant, placing him on notice, which raises a duty of inquiry.
See, e.g., Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 371 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973) (notice of facts suggesting deception raises a duty of
inquiry); Cohen v. Franchard Corp., 478 F.2d 115, 123 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
857 (1973). A failure to investigate facts which were not known, but should have been
known, is a pure negligence standard under Rule 10b-5. Whether liability should be
imposed for a negligent failure to investigate and disclose material facts when the
plaintiff and defendant do not stand in some traditional form of fiduciary relationship
is a decision which trial courts following White must make and which is beyond the
scope of White and this note.
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confusion and fewer contradictory results in Rule 10b-5 cases. 3 5
Trial courts effecting this transition from fiduciary based duties
to Rule 10b-5 derived duties either will resort to earlier precedent to
resolve the issues of duty and scienter, or will formulate new standards in terms of the various duties which may arise under Rule 10b5, free from rigid scienter concepts. In the former case, because many
of the factors determinative of liability will remain unchanged, standards applied by earlier courts may be controlling. Under the latter
course, courts which innovatively apply White will be able to deal
flexibly with cases before them and develop new concepts of duty and
scienter, either stricter or more lenient than earlier standards. Either
course is possible, and conflicting interpretations of White have al3
ready emerged.' 1
' Under these circumstances courts must consider the defendant's awareness-of
potential harm to investors from misrepresentation or nondisclosure, or the amount of
damages as opposed to the culpability of the conduct violating the rule. See SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862-63 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969) (Rule 10b-5 violated when misleading or incomplete information was released in a manner calculated to influence the investing public). See also note 50 supra.
On the other hand, it has been contended that there is no legitimate policy reason for
disallowing recovery by investors injured by misleading corporate press releases solely
because of their numbers. Painter, Rule 10b-5: The Recodification Thicket, 45 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 699, 727 (1971). Another consideration is whether the defendant was
trading in a security without disclosing material information unknown to injured parties. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 264,
276 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (by trading, defendant assumed a duty to disclose to all potential
buyers); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., supra at 848 (anyone in possession of material
inside information must disclose it to the investing public or abstain from trading).
The plaintiff's own diligence to avoid the fraud or ascertain material facts has increasingly become significant in Rule 10b-5 litigation. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 103 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971) (shareholders who sold more than one week after all material facts were disclosed denied recovery). None of these considerations suggests an appropriate scienter standard for open
market transactions, and it is unlikely that the current disagreement among circuit
courts will be resolved in the near future unless the Supreme Court intervenes. A
decision from the Supreme Court on the question has become less likely. Three Rule
10b-5 cases involving a scienter issue, Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchange, 503
F.2d. 364 (7th Cir. 1974); Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414 (6th Cir. 1974);
Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974), were recently denied
review by the Court. 43 U.S.L.W. 3202 (Oct. 15, 1974).
"'Two courts have cited White for authority. One court read the decision as imposing a negligence standard. Little v. First California Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,745 (D. Ariz. July 11, 1974). The other court cited White, noting that if a sufficiently
high duty was established, a Rule 10b-5 action based on negligence and breach of
fiduciary duty could be maintained. Larsen v. Blyth & Co., BNA SEC. REG. L. REP.
266 at A-13 (D. Ore. Aug. 16, 1974).
The Seventh Circuit recently suggested that it has adopted a flexible duty stan-
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Conclusion
White v. Abrams did not suggest any substantive answer to the
question of when negligence will suffice for liability under Rule 10b5. The most significant aspect of White was its rejection of any one
scienter standard as appropriate for liability in all cases, freeing lower
courts from a scienter standard which had hardened into a choice
between negligence or recklessness. Without rigid scienter standards,
trial courts in the Ninth Circuit will be able to deal flexibly and
realistically with Rule 10b-5 cases by focusing precisely on what duties exist between particular parties, and the requisite state of mind
necessary for liability. What specific standards and duties will ultimately be applied will be determined by trial courts applying White.
While it foreclosed strict liability under the rule, White suggests that
a negligence standard will suffice in some cases. In a development of
potentially greater impact, White also suggests that in certain instances negligence or even knowledge will be insufficient scienter, thereby
intimating that plaintiffs may be held to stricter standards of proof
than previously applied in any circuit.
White's most immediate impact will be upon the duty analysis
standard of liability, regardless of the scienter standard which will
ultimately be applied in particular situations. White has broadened
extensively the potential range of duties that Rule 10b-5 imposes, the

dard of liability. See Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974),
petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3475 (U.S. Feb. 20, 1975) (No. 74-1042). The case
involved a suit against an accounting firm as an aider-abettor to a stock fraud scheme.
Denying the defendant's argument that as a matter of law knowledge of the scheme
was necessary for liability as an aider-abettor, the court noted that a claim could be
maintained under Rule 10b-5 by showing that the defendant had knowledge, or but
for a breach of duty of inquiry, should have had knowledge of the fraud. Possession of
such knowledge, the court stated, in conjunction with a failure to act or breach of duty
of disclosure, would allow recovery by the plaintiff. The court then continued:
The foregoing elements comprise a flexible standard of liability which
should be amplified according to the pecularities of each case. Accordingly, where, as here, it is urged that the defendant through action as
well as inaction has facilitated the fraud of another, a claim for aiding
and abetting is made on demonstrating: (1) that the defendant had a
duty of inquiry; (2) the plaintiff was a beneficiary of that duty of
inquiry; (3) the defendant breached the duty of inquiry; (4) concomitant with the breach of duty of inquiry the defendant breached a duty
of disclosure; and (5) there is a causal connection between the breach
of duty of inquiry and disclosure and the facilitation of the underlying
fraud; that is, adequate inquiry and subsequent disclosure would have
led to the discovery of the underlying fraud or its prevention.
Id. at 1104.
The Seventh Circuit did not refer to White v. Abrams in its opinion.
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factors to apply in determining these duties, and the possible variations of scienter necessary for recovery in any case. This analytical
framework for determining liability will be viable only if courts will
precisely articulate the duty involved in each case and will clearly
define the factors relied on in determining the scope of the duty and
appropriate scienter standard. If trial courts merely articulate duty
in terms of prior standards, then the flexible duty standard will represent a change in name only and not in substantive analysis. But if
courts thoroughly pursue the White standard, a significant change in
liability theory and substantive elements of recovery will result. The
precise direction and degree of that change await the decisions of
future courts.
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